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MATHEMAT ICS AN D WORD PLAY

MARTIN GARDNER
Henderson ville, North Carolina
Many mathematicians enjoy wordplay, and for obvious reasons.
is almost a branch of combinatorial mathematic s. The pleasure
derived from solving a combinatorial problem is very much like
the pleasure of solving a cryptogram or a crossword puzzle, or
constructing a good pc lindrome. Given the formal system of arith
metic, ancient mathematicians asked themselves whether the digits
1 through 9 could be placed in a three-by-three matrix so that
rows, columns, and the two diagonals had the same sum. This
is not much different from asking if, given the formal rules of
English, one can construct a three -by -three word square in which
each row, column, and main diagonal is a different word.
It

There is, of course, a difference between com bina torial ma thema t
ics and wordplay. Mathematics is embodied in the structure of
the universe.
Although mathematical systems are free inventions
of human minds, the y have astonishing applications to nature.
No one expected non-Euclidian geometry to be useful, but it proved
t o be essential to relativity theory. Boolean algebra seemed use
less until
surprise' - it turned out to model the electrical net
works of computers. There are hundreds of other outstanding in
stances of what physicist Eugene Wigner has called the "unreason
able effectiveness of mathematics".
Think of the letters and words of a language, together with
its rules, as a formal s y stem. Although the words have arbitrary
meanings assigned to them b y minds, and there may be a "deep
structure" of s y ntax that conforms to logic, the words themselves
have no reality apart from a culture. Butterflies are all over
the world, but yo u will not find the word "butterfly" by looking
throu gh a telescope or microscope. However, once the word becomes
attached to butterflies, it is amusing to observe that butterflies
flutter by. Because language, unlike mathematics, is "artificial ",
wordpla y has more in common with, say, inventing card tricks
or playin g chess.
The
recent

combinatorial nature of wordplay is underscored b y the
use of computers for solving word problems. Disks contain

ing all the words of a langua g e are now available. With suitable
program s the y can be used t o construct word squares, find ana
grams, shortest word ladders, and so on . I wouldn't be surprised
if some da y computers will solve complicated crosswords as easily
as the y n ow solve chess problems.
It

is

worth

noting that both
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mathematics

and wordplay,

solv 

4
ing a problem is curiously like confirming a theory. In solving
a cryptogram, for example, one first makes conjectures. Is a sin
gle-letter word A or I, or maybe O? Is ABCA the word "that"?
Such conjectures are then tested to see if they lead to contradic
tions. If they lead to other words, they gain in their probability
of being correct. Eventually a point is reached at which one is
certain that a cryptogram has been cracked even though not all
its letters are known.
One is tempted to say that when all words are known one can
be absolutely certain a cryptogram has been solved. This is not
the case because, especially if the cryptogram is short, there
just could be another solution that the composer of the puzzle
intended. If, however, the cryptogram is long, such uncertainty
becomes vanishingly small. This is true also in science. When
there is a large abundance of facts explained by a theory, such
as by the Copernican theory or the theory of evolution, certainty
reaches a probability of 0.99999999 ...
Now for a deep metaphysical question. If chess had not been
invented, is there a sense in which theorems about chess can be
said to exist? Assuming the formal system of chess, and given
a certain position on the board, is it permissible to say that
there is a mate in three moves even if no one has posed the prob
lem? -Assuming the structure of a deck of cards, is there a sense
in which a good ca rd trick is somehow "out there ," in a PIa tonic
realm of universals, even if no cc: rds existed?
Suppose there were no English language. Would it be meaningful
to say that given such a language, there is a sense in which
a certain anagram "exists" even if no one spoke English? It is
something like asking if a certain number with a million digits
is prime or composite before anyone has tested the number to find
out. Well, not quite, because alithmetic certainly "exists" as a
forma 1 system.
Anywa y ,
most mathema ticans
are PIa ton ists who
believe that,
no matter how bizarre, or how fa r removed from
realit y a system can be, the y "discover" its theorems rather than
invent them. Even though English is a human construction, nowhere
to be found in nature, is there a sense in which its wordplays
are "real" before anyone finds them? I leave answering this to
my readers.
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